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Solving The Last Mile Problem Between Machine Learning and Security Operations

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Whoami



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 - Academic: IEEE S&P, ACM CCS
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 - Interests: Machine Learning, Cybersecurity



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 - Interests: Cybersecurity, NLP, Knowledge Graph
- Special Thanks
 - Tao Zhou, Quan Lu, Security Operation Team @Alibaba Security



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What is Security Operations?

A security operations center (SOC) is a centralized unit that deals with security issues on an organizational and technical level.

— — Wikipedia



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What is Security Operations ?

What others think I do



What I think I do



What I really do



Why not introduce **Machine Learning** in **SOC** ?



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Challenges

Partially Observable

Hard to collect all security-related data

Uncertainty


Depend on attackers and environment

Correlation

Current decisions affect subsequent

Strong Interpretability

Security needs strong interpretability



Challenges

Partially Observable

Hard to collect all security-related data

Uncertainty


Depend on attackers and environment

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
Strong Interpretability

Security needs strong interpretability



What ML can do in Security

- Data + Close Domain+ Quantitative Expert Experience



Application of Machine Learning in Cyberspace Security Research. Lei Zhang, Yong Cui, Jing Liu, Yong Jiang, Jianping Wu. Chinese Journal of Computers, 2017.



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Is there anything wrong when they meet SOC?



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The Gap Between Machine Learning and Security Operations

Data Scientists



“The Accuracy Rate of Our Model is **99.9%**!”

Security Operation Experts



“Sounds good. But our data scale is enormous. Over **100 million every day.**”

“So, even the accuracy is high, your model will still produce **100000** alerts every day....”

“Well How many alerts can you handle?”

“only **100** alerts per day!”



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The Gap Between Machine Learning and Security Operations



Produce **100000** alerts per day



Handle **100** alerts per day

“And this is only one model.”



The Gap Between Machine Learning and Security Operations

Data Scientists



Produce **100000** alerts per day

Security Operation Experts



Handle **100** alerts per day

“How many attack types we may meet in reality?”



ATT&CK Matrix for Enterprise

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control
Drive-by Compromise	AppleScript	.bash_profile and .bashrc	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScript	Audio Capture	Automated Exfiltration	Commonly Used Port
Exploit Public-Facing Application	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	BITS Jobs	Bash History	Application Window Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Automated Collection	Data Compressed	Communication Through Removable Media
Hardware Additions	Command-Line Interface	Account Manipulation	AppCert DLLs	Binary Padding	Brute Force	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Clipboard Data	Data Encrypted	Connection Proxy
Replication Through Removable Media	Compiled HTML File	AppCert DLLs	Applnit DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Credential Dumping	File and Directory Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services	Data Staged	Data Transfer Size Limits	Custom Command and Control Protocol
Spearphishing Attachment	Control Panel Items	Applnit DLLs	Application Shimming	CMSTP	Credentials in Files	Network Service Scanning	Logon Scripts	Data from Information Repositories	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Custom Cryptographic Protocol
Spearphishing Link	Dynamic Data Exchange	Application Shimming	Bypass User Account Control	Clear Command History	Credentials in Registry	Network Share Discovery	Pass the Hash	Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Command	Data Encoding

ATT&CK (Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge) is a globally-accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations.

— MITRE

The Gap Between Machine Learning and Security Operations

Data Scientists



Produce **100000** alerts per day

Security Operation Experts



Handle **100** alerts per day

“So actually the number of alerts is
 $100000 \times 300 + \text{per day} \dots$ ”



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The Gap Between Machine Learning and Security Operations



Da

Experts

Produce

ts per day



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Can we bridge the gap and solve this awkward thing?



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Our Solutions

- Behavior analysis
- Feature based sorting
- Ensemble risks
- Knowledge graph
- White list
- ...



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Best Practices: Large-Scale Data



Porn Identification

- Labeling is easy
- Labeling is relatively cheap
- Lots of samples




Intrusion detection

- Depend on experience and time consuming
- Security experts are expensive
- Few samples



Best Practices: Behavior Analysis


- A cyber-security problem can be taken as consisting of several subproblems
 - Machine learning can be applied in some part
 - The malicious behaviors can be distinguished by rules or can be clustered
- Our Approach



Best Practices: Behavior Analysis

- Example
 - Domain generating algorithm (DGA) detection
 - A DGA is a program that provides malware with new domains
 - **Mistakes:** Using ML to detect DGAs directly
- Approach
 - ML is used to detect the randomness of domains
 - LSTM, Ngram, and etc.
 - Filter rules
 - IP relationship, number of requests, number of subdomains, and etc.
 - Clustering
 - The features described above, and/or embedding techniques

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kwtoestnessbiophysicalohax.com
rvcxestnessbiophysicalohax.com
hjbtestnessbiophysicalohax.com
txmoestnessbiophysicalohax.com
agekestnessbiophysicalohax.com
dbzwestnessbiophysicalohax.com
sgjxestnessbiophysicalohax.com




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Best Practices: Feature Based Sorting

- Focus on precision
- Feature extraction
 - Assume we have only two features: X and Y
- Scoring:
 - if A is more malicious than B in every dimension, Increment A 's score by one
 - Can be customized
- Sorting:
 - Let N denote all the elements, K as the budget of SOC
 - Sort N by each element's score, and select top K elements



Best Practices: Feature Based Sorting

- Compare with historical data
 - Extract features per day/hour/...
 - Sort the data in a longer time window, e.g. one week
- Application
 - Phishing detection, *Usenix Security'17*
 - UEBA
 - ...
- Limitations
 - At the expense of recall
 - What features to extract is very hard to determine

Ho, G., Javed, A. S. M., Paxson, V., & Wagner, D. (2017). Detecting Credential Spearphishing Attacks in Enterprise Settings. USENIX Security'17



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Best Practices: Accumulation Risk

Alerts Pool

1. xxx
2. xxx
3. xxx
4. xxx



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Best Practices: Accumulation Risk

Traditional Way:

DNS Rare 5

HTTP Rare 3

Phishing 8

.....

Sum 16

malicious.com

Problems behind it:

1. Not all related alerts can be produced.
2. Lateral movement is common.



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Best Practices: Knowledge Graph

Alerts Pool Construction

Identify the Schema

Entity
Extraction

6c5abxxxxxx

MAC

30.xx.xx.xx

IP

a.malicious.com

DOMAIN

Relationship
Extraction

belong

http anomaly

DNS rare

Attribute
Extraction

Kill Chain Stage

Life Cycle

Confidence

Knowledge Fusion

Coreference
Resolution

Entity
Disambiguation

Alerts Pool



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
Best Practices: Accumulation Risk



Some attributes

- Kill chain stage
- Life cycle
- Confidence
-

After identify the Schema, every alert is a **Triple**(entity-relationship-entity).



Alerts Pool

1. xxx
2. xxx
3. xxx
4. xxx

An intrusion case is usually combined by **many multi-hop alerts!**




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

Best Practices: Accumulation Risk

An intrusion case is usually combined by **many multi-hop alerts!**

Eg.



An intrusion graph



Multi-hop alerts






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
Best Practices: Accumulation Risk



Security Operation Experts



Best Practices: Knowledge Graph



Summary

- An in-depth analysis on state-of-the-art security operations and machine learning techniques, reveals the gap between them.
- Several strategies are proposed to solve the last mile problem.
- As showcases, we demonstrate how to implement these approaches in practice.



THANKS



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